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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
purposes of diversity suits a federal court is, in effect, "only another
court of the State." 3 The present case, however, concerns not a
state-created right but one created by Congress for which the only
remedy is in equity. The alleged fraud of the respondents prevented
the petitioners from being diligent and makes it unfair to bar appeal
to equity because of mere lapse of time. The court long ago adopted
the chancery rule that the statute does not begin to run until the dis-
covery of the fraud. 4  This equitable doctrine is read into every fed-
eral statute of limitations. If the Federal Farm Loan Act had an
express statute of limitations, the time would not have begun to -run
until after petitioners had discovered, or had failed to exercise reason-
able diligence to discover, the alleged deception by Bache.5
The court, in rejecting the defense of the state statute of limita-
tions, stated succinctly that "It would be too incongruous to confine a
federal right within the bare terms of a State statute of limitations
unrelieved by the settled federal equitable doctrine as to fraud, where
even a federal statute in the same terms would be given the mitigat-
ing construction required by that doctrine." 6
It is interesting to note that what, the Circuit Court of Appeals
labeled as a statement of historical background rather than present
law, the Supreme Court has stated as living law, vz4 ., federal courts,
when sitting as a court of equity, are not obligated to apply local
statutes of limitations in cases concerning a federal right where such
statutes conflict with equitable principles. This case has redefined




TION IN NEw YORK.-The appellant, a Canadian corporation, and
the respondent, a New York corporation, negotiated a contract in
New York under which disputes were to be settled by arbitration in
New York. The parties agreed that the award of the arbitrators was
to be final and binding on both parties, and that settlement under an
arbitration award was to be made within ten days from the date of
such award. If the award was not so settled, the contract provided
that "Judgment may be entered thereon in accordance with the prac-
tice of any Court having jurisdiction." An award was made in favor
of respondent pursuant to an arbitration of which the appellant had
3 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108, 89 L. ed. 2079, 2086
(1945).
4 Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 22 L. ed. 636 (U. S. 1875).
5 Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 22 L. ed. 636 (U. S. 1875) ; Exploration
Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 435, 62 L. ed. 1200 (1918); United States v.
Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 255 U. S. 323, 65 L. ed. 660 (1921).G Holmberg v. Armbrecbt, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 590, 593, 594 (1946).
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notice, but in which the appellant did not participate. Respondent
then moved for an order confirming the arbitration award and for
the entry of judgment thereon, serving the motion papers upon appel-
lant by mail. Appellant defaulted on this motion and an order was
entered confirming the award and directing entry of judgment. Ap-
pellant thereupon moved to vacate the judgment and proceedings
supplementary to judgment which had been commenced by respon-
dent. This motion was denied. Held, reversed. The appellant did
not consent to the jurisdiction of the New York court by consenting
to arbitration in New York. Red Line Comnercial Co. v. Pastene
Co., 269 App. Div. 632, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 143 (1st Dep't 1945).
It was the appellant's contention that the New York court never
obtained personal jurisdiction over it and therefore could not render
a money judgment against it. The majority of the appellate court
sustained this contention. Ordinarily a court can acquire jurisdiction
of the person of a defendant only by service of process within the
jurisdiction of the court.' However, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant may be acquired by his consent. This consent may be
given either before or after action has been brought; 2 the statute 3
does not provide the exclusive methods of obtaining personal juris-
diction over a foreign corporation. 4
The majority of the court held that the appellant did not consent
to the jurisdiction of the New York court. They relied on Sargent v.
Monroe 5 as determinative of the issue involved in the instant case.
In that case it was said: "While the defendant participated in the
arbitration and authorized Foster to act as his representative for the
purposes of the arbitration, it cannot be said that the authority so
conferred extended to a proceeding in the English courts for the en-
forcement of the award as a judgment. Once the award became final,
the authority ceased unless the defendant submitted to the jurisdic-
tion of the English courts personally or through his duly authorized
agent." However, Sargent v. Monroe is distinguishable from the
instant case, for in that case the contract made no provision for entry
of judgment upon an award.
Two of the five judges believed that the words of the contract
were tantamount to a consent by the appellant to the jurisdiction of
the New York court. They relied on the case of Gilbert v. Burn-
1 Pohlers v. Exeter Manufacturing Co., 293 N. Y. 274, 56 N. E. (2d) 582
(1944) ; Howard Converters v. French Art Mills, 273 N. Y. 238, 7 N. E. (2d)
115 (1937) ; Geary v. Geary, 272 N. Y. 390, 6 N. E. (2d) 67 (1936).
2 Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. $. 41, 44, 36 L. ed. 338, 339 (1892) ; Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 735, 24 L. ed. 565 (1878) ; Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y.
348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931).
3 NEv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE AcT §§ 229, 235.
4 Howard Converters v. French Art Mills, 273 N. Y. 238, 7 N. E. (2d)
115 (1937) ; Esperti v. Cardinale Trucking Co., 263 App. Div. 46, 31 N. Y. S.
(2d) 253 (2d Dep't 1941).
5 268 App. Div. 123, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 546 (1st Dep't 1944).
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stine,6 where the Court of Appeals held: "Defendant's agreement
without reservation to arbitrate in London according to the English
statute necessarily implied a submission to the procedure whereby that
law is there enforced. Otherwise the inference must be drawn that
they never intended to abide by their pledge. They contracted that
the machinery by which their arbitration might proceed would be
foreign machinery operating from the foreign court." Gilbert v.
Burnstine is similar to the instant case in that the defendant did not
participate in the arbitration and was served without the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. It differs in that the defendant agreed to be
found by arbitration in London pursuant to the arbitration law of
Great Britain. Whereas in the instant case the appellant agreed that
judgment could be entered on an award in accordance with the prac-
tice of any court having jurisdiction.
The meaning of the latter clause is the real question involved in
this case. If it means, as appellant contended, that a New York court
could enter judgment against it only if that court could obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction after the 'arbitration award was made, then the
judgment must be vacated. However, such a construction at its
very best is extremely narrow and strained, and the clause, if such a
construction were intended, might just as well have been omitted from
the contract. It seems more logical to assume that the words had
meaning and significance, and that the parties intended that if an
award was made, the proper New York court would have jurisdiction
by consent, and judgment could be entered thereon by such court.
To hold otherwise frustrates the only purpose the clause could serve.
I.K.
LABoR-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT-OvERTIME COMPENSA-
TION-BONUSEs REGULARLY PAID.-Defendant, engaged in the manu-
facture of building construction materials, employs some 65 employees
who are admittedly covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 In
April, 1942, defendant's board of directors adopted a resolution pro-
viding that, commencing in June, 1942, all of the company's employees,
with the exception of certain finishers, should be paid a monthly bonus,
in war stamps, of 10% of their weekly base salaries for the previous
month. The finishers were placed on an incentive bonus plan. For
some two and one-half years, the bonuses were received by the em-
ployees. The employer was not legally obligated to pay such bonus,
and the employees knew that it was not contractual and that it could
be discontinued had the company's finances so dictated. The defen-
dant company always considered the bonus payments as wages for
purposes of computing social security, unemployment insurance, with-
6 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931).
152 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. §§201-219 (1938).
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